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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. ("U.C.A.") § 78-2-2 (3) (ii) (2002) grants the Utah Supreme Court
original appellate jurisdiction over final formal agency decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission. Under U.C. A. § 78-2-2 (4) the Utah Supreme Court may, at its discretion,
transfer a case to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

DID THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION PROPERLY
DETERMINE THAT BRADLEY SCOTT'S PRIMARY
RESIDENCE FOR THE 2001 TAX YEAR WAS HIS HOME
IN PARK CITY?
This issue was preserved below by the body of arguments made at hearing (R. 00152-

190) and by the Tax Commission Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision
(County Brief Add. E)
Standard of Review: The determination of the issue before the Court is a question of
fact. On review, the Court grants deference to the Tax Commission's written findings of fact,
,ipplyiii!! a substantial evidence standard. U.C.A. § 59-1-610 (a) (2002). The Utah Supreme
Court has stated that in "reviewing questions of fact, we defer to a great degree to the
Commission's findings and reverse only where they are without foundation in the evidence."
State (Tax Com'n) v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051,1053 (Utah 1984). The Utah
Courts have also held specifically "that the Tax Commission's determination of domicile
involves a question of fact, reviewing such determination under a 'substantial evidence'
standard of review." Orton v. Utah State Tax Com'n. Collection Div.. 864 P.2d 904, 907
(Utah App. 1993) (citing O'Rourke v. Utah StateTax Commission. 830 P.2d 230, 232 (Utah
1992)). See also Allen v. Greyhound Lines. Inc.. 583 P.2d 613, 614 (Utah 1978) (stating the

1

"sole issue presented for the trial judge's determination was one of fact, viz., the place of
plaintiffs domicile.")
The Utah Court of Appeals in Traveler/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 2002 UT App 221, f
13, 51 P.3d 1288, quoted Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1931 (1986) for the
synonymous use of the terms residency and domicile in the definition of "reside" and
"residing." The Court noted that "cases have either distinguished between 'domicile' and
'residence' or used them interchangeably." Id. at n. 4 (citing Frame v. Residency Appeals
Comm. Of Utah State Univ., 675 P.2d 1157, 1159 n. 1 (Utah 1983)).
Where courts have made a distinction "domicile is presumed to follow residency."
Allen, 583 P.2d at 615. In Clements v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, Collection Div., 893 P.2d
1078 (Utah App. 1995) the Court of Appeals explained that "domicile will be found where
there is a residence coupled with an intent to remain for an indefinite period." Id. at 1081
(citing Gardner v.Gardner, 118 Utah 496, 222 P.2d 1055,1057 (Utah 1950)).
Therefore, domicile and residency are either used synonymously and residence like
domicile is a factual determination, or the factual determination of domicile is based upon a
factual finding of residency plus a factual finding of intent to remain. In either case it can be
fairly said that "the Tax Commission's determination of [residency] involves a question of
fact," and the Court examines "such determination under a 'substantial evidence' standard of
review." See Orton, 864 P.2d at 907.
II.

CAN A HUSBAND AND WIFE HAVE SEPARATE DOMICILES AND
THEREFORE CONSTITUTE TWO HOUSEHOLDS WITH SEPARATE
RESIDENCES FOR TAX PURPOSES AND IF SO WERE JULIAN SCOTT
AND THE SCOTT CHILDREN DOMICILED IN SALT LAKE?

2

The permissibility of duel residences for husband and wife is a legal determination
which ti rj i .^nrt reviews i indei acoi i ection of ei i < »i «i w idai ci, granting no deference to tl le
decision of the Tax Commission. U.C.A. § 59-1 ~h I o

Whether Julian Scott and the children

were domiciled at the Salt Lake home during the _uu; tax year is a factual determination as
described above.
There is, however, nofinaljudgment or order as to those issues for the Court to
i eview, since the Tax Commission did not reach the Issn le of duel residency and declin sd tc
make a determinative finding as to the residence of Julian Scott and the children. Appellee
therefore argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to J-

• •• -^ issues.

The question of Julian Scott and the Scott children's domicile was preserved below at
hearing and in the Tax Commission's decision. The issue of duel residency was preserved in
the Hearing (R 001 54) and in 1 ax Commission Finding of Fact # 9. (County Brief Add. E. at
p. 30
Si A 1 £ M E N T QF THE

CAs£

Bradley and his wife Julian Scott own two residential homes, one purchased in 1989
and located in Park City, I J tali, and the other pin chased in I 999 and located in Salt I ake City,
Utah. Mrs. Scott and the Scott's four children established residence in the Park City home in
1997. Mr. Scott followed in 1998. I he Scott family purchased the Salt Lake home to
accommodate the children's schooling at Rowland Hall in Salt Lake City. Mrs. Scott and
children spend four nights a week at the Salt Lake home, where Mr. Scott joins them
approximate^ tw o nights aw eek I he family spends the balance of their time at the Park
City home. Mr. Scott, is an active member of the Park City community, even to the extent of
declaring his candidacy foi Mayor in spring of 2001

3

Both homes received tax exemptions as primary residences in the 2000 tax year. In
the 2001 tax year Summit County reclassified the Park City home as a secondary residence
and removed the tax exemption. Mr. Scott appealed the reclassification to the Summit
County Board of Equalization, which upheld the determination of the Summit County
Assessor.
Mr. Scott then appealed to the Utah State Tax Commission. The Commission
reversed the decision of the Summit County Board of Equalization, finding that the Park City
home was Mr. Scott's primary residence. The Tax Commission did not reach the issue of two
primary residences, but found based on the limited evidence for the residence of Mrs. Scott
and the children that it was possible their primary residence was also Park City.

<

The Summit County Board of Equalization filed its appeal from the decision of the
Tax Commission with the Utah Supreme Court on June 20, 2003. On August 1, 2003, the
i

Utah Court Supreme Court issued an order assigning this case to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The subject residential property (the "Park City home") is located in Park City at

i

8200 Royal Street, which is in the Stag Lodge development at Deer Valley.
2.

At issue is whether the Park City home qualifies for the 45% primary residential
exemption from property taxes for the 2001 tax year.

3.

Bradley and Julian Scott have owned the Park City home since 1989. Prior to the
summer of 1997, the Scott family lived in California and used the subject property
i
as a vacation home.

4.

In the summer of 1997, Ms. Scott and the four children moved from California and
established their residence at the Park City home. Mr. Scott remained in

4

|

California until late 1998 to attend to business affairs, at which time he also moved
to Utah and established his residence in Park City.
5.

In the autumn of 1997, the Scott children were enrolled at Rowland Hall, a private
school located in Salt Lake City. For over a year, the children commuted to school
from the subject property in Park City.

6.

In the spring of 1999, the Scotts purchased another home, located at 1101 N. Oak
Forest Road in Salt Lake City (the "Salt Lake home"). This home was purchased
to accommodate the children's schooling and social activities, and to eliminate the
burden of the commute.

7.

The family calls the Salt Lake home the "school home" and the entire family stays
at the Park City home on weekends and during school vacations.

8.

When school is in session Mrs. Scott and the children generally spend four nights
and week at the Salt Lake home and the remaining three nights at the Park City
home.

9.

Mr. Scott typically spends five nights a week at the Park City home and two nights
a week in Salt Lake.

10.

The Park City home and the Salt Lake home are similar in size, are both fully
furnished and received relatively similar assessments for the 2001 tax year.

11.

Both homes received the primary residential exemption for the 2000 tax year.
The Summit County and Salt Lake County assessors discussed the issue of
residential exemption and the Salt Lake County assessor decided that the Salt Lake
home qualified for the exemption. As a result, the Summit County assessor
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removed the primary residential exemption from the Park City home. The Summit
County Board of Equalization sustained the assessor's action.
12.

Mr. Scott appealed Summit County's action and asked the Tax Commission to
reinstate the primary residential exemption on the Park City home.

13.

Both Bradley and Julian Scott listed the Park City home as their home address and
mailing address on their 2001 Federal Income Tax Return and their 2001 Utah
Individual Income Tax Return, both filed jointly.

14.

The 2001 Park City telephone directory listed "Bradley Scott" at the address of the
Park City home. Mr. Scott's only Salt Lake listing was for his office at 9
Exchange Place. No listing could be found for the Salt Lake home.

15.

Mr. Scott's Utah driver's license, issued early in 1999, lists the Park City home as
his address, as does his Park City library card.

16.

Mr. Scott was president of the Stag Lodge Owners Association, where the Park
City home is located, in 2001. In 2001 he was also a member of the Board of
Trustees of the Summit Institute for the Arts.

17.

Mr. Scott was not a member or sponsor of any organization in Salt Lake City in
2001.

18.

The Scott family's church records are located at the Park City ward of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. The most recent baptism of one of the Scott
children occurred at the Park City ward.

19.

None of the Scott children attend public school. They attend private school and
participate in extra-curricular activities in Salt Lake City.
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20.

Mr. Scott announced as a candidate for mayor of Park City in March or April of
2001. After preparing campaign literature he withdrew his candidacy when his
voting in Salt Lake City in the 2000 general election became an issue.

21.

Mr. Scott was registered to vote in Salt Lake City because the voter registration
form required a physical mailing address and specifically instructed the registrant
not to list a post office box. Because mail was delivered to a Park City post office
box rather than to the Stag Lodge homes Mr. Scott entered the address of the Salt
Lake home—his only physical residence mailing address. This resulted in Mr.
Scott's registration in Salt Lake City, even though he listed Park City as his home
address. Mr. Scott voted in Salt Lake City in the 2000 general election and has not
changed his voter registration.

22.

Since summer of 1999 Mr. Scott has maintained an office at 9 Exchange Place in
Salt Lake City, for the monitoring of his investments. Mr. Scott is retired and does
not operate any business from this office.

23.

Mr. Scott chose this location partly because a Park City friend is the owner of the
building and Mr. Scott was able to lunch with and commute with his friend.

24.

Mr. Scott's controller is located at the Exchange Place office, where bills and other
mail are delivered. All mail goes to that location with the exception of cards and
letters addressed to the Salt Lake home.

25.

In 1997 Mr. Scott opened a bank account at the Park City branch of Wells Fargo
and established a banking relationship with private client services representative
DarrinBurg.

7

26.

When the Park City branch closed in 1999 and Mr. Burg was transferred to a Salt
Lake City office Mr. Scott maintained the relationship with Mr. Burg and
transferred his account to Salt Lake.

27.

The Scott family owns or leases a number of motor vehicles, none of which are
registered at the Salt Lake home.

28.

2001 vehicle registration forms submitted by Mr. Scott show that the vehicles
registered at the Park City home in 2001 included a Toyota 4Runner, a Dodge
Truck, a Mercedes Benz, a boat and trailer. An Audi, a BMW, a Ferrari and a
Bentley were registered at the 9 Exchange Place office.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court should dismiss this appeal on the basis that Summit County fails to address

the only issue validly before Court and invalidly attempts to argue an issue upon which there
is no final judgment or order and that the County lacks standing to raise.
The Tax Commission's only finding was that the primary residence of Bradley Scott
in the 2001 tax year was at the family's home in Park City, and that, based on limited
evidence, this was possibly also the primary residence of Mrs. Scott and the Scott children.
The County has not challenged this finding, which is supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
The Tax Commission did not address the issue of duel primary residences. Therefore,
this issue is not part of the "judgment or order"fromwhich the County appeals and is not
before the Court. Furthermore, the County lacks standing to raise that issue. The Park City
home has been established without challenge as the primary residence. Therefore, an actual
controversy over duel residency rests solely upon the status of the Scott's Salt Lake home,

8

which falls within the jurisdiction of Salt Lake County, not Summit County. Moreover, the
tax classification of the Park City home is not contingent upon either the tax classification of
the Salt Lake home or the permissibility of duel primary residences. Consequently, neither of
these issues impact Summit County's tax revenues, leaving the County without a stake in
these issues. However, because the County has argued the issue of duel residency, Appellee
argues in the alternative that under appropriate circumstances closely associated persons may
establish separate domiciles, thus constituting multiple households each entitled to the
primary residential tax exemption. Because Julian Scott and the Scott children have
established a domicile at the Salt Lake house the Scott family constitutes two households for
property tax purposes.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THIS APPEAL BECAUSE APPELLANT
HAS NOT CHALLENGED THE ONLY ISSUE DECIDED BY THE TAX
COMMISSION.
A. The Issue of Bradley Scott's Primary Residence in the 2001 Tax Year is the
Only Question Decided by the Tax Commission.
The County states that the "Utah State Tax Commission (the "commission")

determined that the Scotts were entitled to two primary residential property tax exemptions,
one in Park City and the other in Salt Lake City." (County Brief p. 7.) The County is
incorrect. The Commission, in fact, made no determination of duel residency. To the
contrary, it stated that "[t]he primary residential exemption of the Park City home is the only
issue in this matter," (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision ("FFCLFD")
County Brief Add. E p. 13), and "[a]t issue in this case is whether the Petitioners are entitled
to receive the primary residential exemption on the subject property." (FFCLFD, Applicable
Law # 1, County Brief Add. E p. 7.)

9

B. The County Has Not Challenged the Tax Commission's Determination that the
Park City Home Was Bradley Scott's Primary Residence in 2001, and Has
Failed to Marshal and Discount the Evidence Supporting that Determination.
The County's Brief contains no challenge to the only determination made by the Tax
Commission, its finding that for purposes of U. C. A. 59-2-103 (2), providing a property tax
exemption for property used as a primary residence, the Scott's Park City home was the
primary residence of Bradley Scott for the 2001 tax year. Rather, the County spends both its
issue statement and argument entirely on the question of duel residency, which the Tax
Commission did not reach.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 4 (a) provides for "Appeal from a Final Judgment
or Order," and requires that a notice of appeal be filed "within 30 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealedfrom"

(Emphasis added.) The requirement for a final

judgment or order has been met in the instant case as to the issue of the primary residence of
Bradley Scott. It is also necessary, however, that the appellant challenge, or appeal from, that
final judgment or order. An appellant has no latitude to either neglect to make such a
challenge, or to invent an order of its own choosing and then rush off tilting after that
windmill. Appellant here has done both.
Rule 24 (a) (9) presupposes a challenge to the actual judgment or order when it
specifies in relevant part that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding." As established above under Standard of
Review, the Tax Commission's determination of residency is a question of fact. It is
uncontested that the facts enumerated in the Tax Commission's Findings of Fact are
supported by evidence in the record and themselves constitute the evidentiary support for the
Tax Commission's finding that Bradley Scott's primary residence during the 2001 tax year
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was located at the Park City home, situated in Summit County. Appellee refers the Court to
the Tax Commission's Findings of Fact and to the Facts section above, incorporated here by
reference. The Tax Commission's determination, based on this evidence, that the Park City
was Mr. Scott's primary residence, rests upon a solid foundation in the record. The County
has made no attempt to marshal, or even acknowledge, these facts and has neither challenged
the Commission's finding of primary residency nor attacked the substantiality of the
supporting evidence.
II.

THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE ISSUE OF DUEL
RESIDENCY BECAUSE THAT QUESTION WAS NOT PART OF THE
TAX COMMISSION'S DECISION
Finding # 9 notes that "[Bradley Scott] asks the Tax Commission to either find that he

and his family have two 'households'... or find that the family constitutes one 'household'
that is domiciled at the park City Subject property." (County Brief Add. E p. 3.) The Tax
Commission chose the latter alternative and made a positive determination that the Park City
home was the primary residence of Bradley Scott. The Commission declined to definitively
adjudicate the question of "households" and the residence of Julian Scott and the children on
the basis of insufficient evidence, stating that "[f]rom the limited information provided about
Mrs. Scott and the Scott children, it is possible that their domicile was also at the Park City
subject property as of the lien date." ( County Brief Add. E p. 13 (emphasis added).) Thus,
the Tax Commission did not adjudicate the issue of duel residency and therefore the duel
residency question is not part of the final decision or order from which appeal can be taken.
Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide that issue. The decision addressed by this
appeal is confined to the factual determination of Bradley Scott's primary residence, which is
supported by substantial evidence and which the County failed to challenge.
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III.

THE COUNTY LACKS STANDING TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF DUEL
PRIMARY RESIDENCY
A. The Duel Residency Question Can Be Reached in the Context of an Actual
Controversy Only Through a Challenge to the Status of the Salt Lake Home.
The Tax Commission designated the Park City home as Bradley Scott's primary

residence without regard to the status of the Salt Lake home. The County may attempt to
argue that authorization of duel residency is implied in the finding that Park City is Bradley
Scott's primary residence. Such an argument fails in light of the Commission's determination
that the residence of Mrs. Scott and the family may also be in Park City and the absence from
the decision of any mention of the Salt Lake home. Thus, the Commission's determination
that the tax classification of the Park City home is a primary residence stands alone, leaving

<

Salt Lake County free to remove the primary residence classification from the Salt Lake home
at its own discretion.
With the Park City home uncontested as the primary residence, only the tax
classification of the Salt Lake home gives rise to an actual controversy in the question of
whether one family can constitute two "households" for tax exemption purposes. The issue of

*

duel residency remains merely theoretical until a challenge to the status of the Salt Lake home
is raised by a party with standing to do so. See Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384
(Utah 1996) (holding that the Court's jurisdiction rests upon a justiciable controversy); Olson

'

v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 724 P.2d 960, 962 n. 1 (Utah 1986) (appellate "court will not
issue advisory opinions"); Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216
I
(Utah App. 1991) (recognizing the "longstanding judicial policy in Utah to avoid advisory
opinions"); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah App. 1990) (appellate courts
decide only actual controversies).

4
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B. The County Lacks Standing to Challenge Salt Lake County's Classification of
the Salt Lake Home and thus Raise the Issue of Duel Residency.
An action must be brought by a party with a stake in the outcome. In Jenkins v. Swan.
675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme Court examined the issue of standing. The
Court explained that "one who is adversely affected by governmental actions has standing . . .
. One who is not adversely affected has no standing." Id at 1150.
Because Park City is the primary residence whether the Scott family has one residence
or two neither the tax classification of the Salt Lake home nor the determination of the duel
residency question impacts the tax revenues of Summit County and the County has no stake in
those issues. Moreover, tax decisions regarding the Salt Lake home are outside of Summit
County's jurisdiction. As a non-party in interest the County lacks standing to challenge the
status of the Salt Lake house, or raise the issue of duel residency. Such standing resides only
in Salt Lake County, Bradley Scott, and the Tax Commission, who are not appellants in this
case and have not put the status of the Salt Lake home or the issue of duel residential
exemptions before the Court.1 Thus, the issue of duel residency is not part of this appeal,
notwithstanding its prominence in the County's brief.
IV.

IF THE COURT FINDS THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION TO ADDRESS
THE ISSUE OF DUEL PRIMARY RESIDENCES, UNDER THE UNIQUE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE BRADLEY SCOTT AND HIS
FAMILY CONSTITUTE TWO HOUSEHOLDS EACH OF WHICH IS
ENTITLED TO THE PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL EXEMPTION.

Appellee vigorously maintains its position that the Court lacks jurisdiction to address the
issue of duel residency because the Tax Commission's decision did not address that issue,

1

All three of these entities satisfy the Jenkins requirement for an entity with "a greater interest
in the outcome," here of the duel residency question, "than the plaintiff," thus avoiding the
necessity for the Court to grant standing on that issue to Summit County. Id.
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which, additionally, the County lacks standing to raise. Without conceding jurisdiction or
standing, however, Appellee Bradely Scott argues in the alternative that he and his family
fulfill the conditions under which one family may legally constitute two households for
purposes of the primary residential tax exemption.
A. One Family May Legally Constitute Two Households Under the U.C.A. 59-21202 Definition.
Section 59-2-1202 (4) defines "household" as "an association of persons who live
in the same dwelling, sharing its furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and expenses." The
operative word for the purposes of this appeal is "live."
The County cites the Tax Commission decision Black v. Board of Equalization,
Appeal No. 02-0598 (Tax Commission 2001) , in which a cohabiting couple who jointly
owned property in Salt Lake and Summit counties sought to establish a primary residence in
each location. The Commission stated that "for Mrs. Black and Mr. Forster to each receive a
primary residential exemption, they would need to show that they are domiciled at different
locations and do not comprise a household." (County Brief Add. F. at p. 5.) The Commission
then concluded that the couple's status as a household was contingent upon the status of their
respective domiciles, stating "[t]o determine if Ms. Black and Mr. Forster are considered one
household for purposes of the primary residential exemption, we must first examine each of

2

Appellee notes that under U.C.A. § 59-1-502.5 (4) "A record may not be kept of the initial
hearing and all initial hear proceedings are privileged." Therefore, Appellee argues that Tax
Commission decisions based on initial hearings, such as Black lack precedential value.
However, since the County has relied upon one such decision and upon another based on a
Telephone Settlement Conference, and has reproduced both in its Brief, Appellee, without
conceding precedential value, responds to the County's arguments, and brings to the Court's
attention a Tax Commission decision supporting duel households for a married couple. This
decision is reproduced in redacted form to protect the privacy of the Petitioners as Addendum
A in Appellee's Brief
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their domiciles to determine if they have primary residences in separate locations or not." Id.
(emphasis added).
The Commission first firmly established the Salt Lake property as the fundamental
primary residence, as it has done with Park City home here. Thus, the Summit County
property in Black is analogous to the Salt Lake home here, in terms of being the residence of
uncertain tax classification status. From this point on, however, the instant case and Black are
distinguishable on the facts. Unlike the Salt Lake home here, the Summit property in Black
lacked persuasive indication that anyone was actually living there. The Tax Commission
found that Mr. Forster's allegations that he spent most nights in the Summit County home, his
Summit County voter registration, his telephone listing at the Summit County address, and his
payment of the utility bills there were outweighed by the facts that: none of his vehicles were
registered at the Summit County property; he listed his Salt Lake business as his home
address on federal and state income tax returns; he received no mail in Summit County; he did
all of his banking in Salt Lake near his business; he also had a telephone book listing at his
Salt Lake business address; and even the address on his driver's license was that of the Salt
Lake business. Particularly pertinent was the Tax Commission's finding that "the Summit
property is only accessible in winter with snowmobiles,... and that no other home in the
Canyon Rim Ranch development. . . is used as a primary residence" Id. at 6 (emphasis
added). Thus, the Summit property was essentially a vacation cabin in the woods rather than
a year-round home in an established residential neighborhood as is the Salt Lake home in this
appeal.
Only after determining domicile did the Tax Commission reach the issue of
household, stating "[hjaving concluded that Ms. Black and Mr. Forster are both domiciled at
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the Salt Lake property, it is apparent from the facts and testimony that they are a
'household'." Id. at 7. Because Ms. Black and Mr. Forster had one domicile the Tax
Commission classified them as one household.
The County maintains that the "Commission has misinterpreted the term 'household'
by confusing it with 'domicile'." The confusion, however, is entirely the County's. The Tax
Commission examined the indicators of domicile in order to determine that Bradley Scott had
his residence at the Park City home. It did not reach the issue of household. Because section
59-2-1201 (4) defines household in terms of domicile the Commission could reach the issue
of whether the Scott family constituted one or two households only by determining that
Bradley Scott was domiciled at Park City, which it did, and also determining the domicile of
Julian Scott and the children, which it declined to do.
The County quotes an unpublished 1997 Advisory Opinion letter for the proposition
that if a property owner is a Utah resident with more than one home, neither of which is
rented or leased to another party as a primary residence, the Commission will assume that the
owner uses one home as a primary and one as a secondary residence. (County Brief, p. 8.)
This is a perfectly logical statement but proves nothing since it is couched in the singular. Of
course one individual property owner can have only one primary residence. The citation
however, is not helpful because it supplies no information as to several individuals, such as
the husband, wife, and children before the Court here.
Finally, the County attempts to rely on Hadley v. County Board of Equalization of
Washington County, Appeal No. 94-2128 (Tax Commission 1994), a 1994 decision in which
the Tax Commission denied duel residency to a couple with homes in Salt Lake and St.
George. There the Commission stated that "Petitioner seeks to divide the primary residential
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property characteristics between a husband and wife. This practice would allow a husband
and wife to have separate primary residences and thwart the intent of the statute." (County
Brief at 8.) Times change, however, as society and finally the law recognize the increasing
independence of individuals even within intact families. Hadley was superceded in 2002
when the Tax Commission issued the contrary ruling that a husband and wife spending the
majority of their time in separate homes were entitled to duel primary residences. In order to
protect the privacy provided to petitioners under U.C.A. 59-1-502.5 (4) we refer to this
decision as Couple. (See Add. A., redacted copy of decision.) As in Black the Commission
first examined domicile in order to determine household. In Couple the Commission stated
that "for [husband] and [wife] to each receive a primary residential exemption, they would
need to show that they are domiciled at different locations and do not comprise a household."
(Add. A at p. 5.) Based on the evidence provided the Commission concluded that "[a]s the
parties were domiciled at two separate locations on January 1, 2002, the Commission does not
consider them to be a 'household,' for purposes of the primary residential exemption." The
Commission further concluded that "[although they routinely visit one another, we do not
consider persons with separate domiciles to live in the 'same dwelling' and, as a result, they
do not constitute a single 'household.'" (Add A. at p. 8.)
In Couple the Commission acknowledged that "[s]ection C. of Rule 52 provides that
the primary residential exemption is limited to one primary residence per household."
However, the Commission then definitively stated that it "considers [husband] and [wife] to
be two households as of the lien date," and that therefore, "the limitation of Section C, which
applies to a single household, does not apply to Petitioners." (Add. A at p. 8-9)
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It is very interesting to note the Commission's comment that "[t]his ruling comports
with the decision in Tax Commission Appeal No. 02-0598 (2002), in which the Commission
stated that a couple could each receive a primary residential exemption if they showed that
they were domiciled at different locations and did not comprise a household." Appeal No. 020598 is Black. Therefore, whatever the interpretation imposed upon Black by the County in
the instant case, the Tax Commission itself intended the Black decision to support the
possibility of duel residencies under the right circumstances. Although the facts in Black did
not meet these circumstance the reality is that duel residences for cohabiting and even married
individuals are sometimes legally permissible. Therefore, if Julian Scott and the four Scott
children have a different domicile than the Park City home established as the residence of
Bradley Scott then the Scott family, like the husband and wife in Couple, constitutes two
households with separate residences each eligible for the primary residential tax exemption.
B. Julian Scott and the Four Scott Children Have Their Domicile at the Salt Lake
Home and Therefore the Scott Family Constitutes Two Households Each
Entitled to the Primary Residential Tax Exemption.
Section E. of Utah Administrative Rule 884-24-52 ("Rule 52") provides a list
intended as a guideline in determining domicile, which the Tax Commission set forth under
Applicable Law (County Brief Add. E. p. 8-9) and is incorporated here by reference.
Responses to these items as to Julian Scott and the children relative to the Salt Lake home,
insofar as known, are as follows: 1. Voter registration was in Salt Lake and it is likely that
Julian Scott voted there; 2. Julian Scott and the children have been in continuous residency
since 1999, excepting school vacations and holidays; 3. the nature and quality of living
accommodations in the two homes is comparable; 4. family members present in the Salt Lake
home are mother and all children with visits from the father; 5. Julian Scott's spouse resides

18

in Park City; 9. Church membership in Park City with other affiliations unknown for Julian
Scott; 11. the children attend school (private, not public) in Salt Lake, which is also the site of
their extra-curricular and social activities. Thus, it can be argued that a preponderance of the
evidence supports the domicile of Julian Scott and the children in the Salt Lake home and the
Scott family, like the family in Couple, constitutes two households, each entitled to one
primary residential property tax exemption.
C. Denying a Designation of Two Households to Closely Associated Individuals
In Appropriate Circumstances Is Counter to Public Policy and Possibly
Unconstitutional.

The County expresses concern that a wholesale grant of primary residence status
to vacation homes would undercut tax revenues. However a realistic assessment of self
interest alone should ease this fear. Both Black and Hadley, the very decisions cited by the
County, illustrate the strict criteria for domicile applied by the Tax Commission before it
reduces its own income by granting duel primary residency to closely associated individuals.
The much greater concern is the implication that the act of forming a family through
marriage or even a long-term cohabitational relationship prevents an individual from
establishing a residence. Such a policy arguably deprives that individual of the equal
protection of the law under United States Constitution Amendment XIV and violates uniform
operation of the laws under Utah Constitution Article I section 24.
Furthermore, such a policy discriminates against intact families by essentially
requiring that a husband and wife whose professional, family, or other obligations require
them to maintain separate residences divorce or separate in order to receive the tax exemption
designed the ease the burden of residential maintenance. Civilized society's strong public
policy interest in fostering intact families is supported by almost innumerable studies showing
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the benefits of such families to both children and adults. Moreover, tax policies have been
shown to definitively impact family patterns. See Taxing the Family. The Family in America,
Vol. 18, No. 4, April 2003 (compiling sources). Therefore, it is in the best interest of society
to recognize separate residences when they do, in fact, exist.
CONCLUSION
Appellee entreats the Court to dismiss this appeal for lack ofjurisdiction on the
ground that the County has failed to challenge the finding of the Tax Commission, and has
instead attempted to argue an issue that was not adjudicated and that the County lacks
standing to raise. In so doing the Court should leave undisturbed the Tax Commission's
factual determination that for the 2001 tax year the primary residence of Bradley Scott was
located at the home in Park City and should defer the issue of duel residency to the day when
it is raised by a party with standing conferred by a stake in the outcome.
If, however, the Court chooses to address the issue of duel primary residency,
Appellee requests the Court to hold that constitutional, legal, and public policy considerations
support the designation of a single family as two households in certain circumstances and that
the Scott family has established two domiciles, thus constituting two households each eligible
for the primary residential tax exemption.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of November, 2003.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter came before the Commission for an Initial Hearing, which was held
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §59-1-502.5 on November 6, 2002.
The Petitioners are a married couple who have appealed the 2001 assessment of a
home i n W H H H H H f vision i n f l H H H J ^ t f f Canyon that sits on a 0.21- acre lot. The home
was built-in 1999 and is comprised of 1672 square feet on the main floor and 420 square feet in the
basement. There is also a basement garage in the home that measures 864 square feet. Salt Lake
County initially assessed the subject as a primary residential property with a fair market value of

for the 2001 tax year. Petitioners appealed the fair market value of the subject to the
Respondent, which reduced the fair market value to B H B | However, the Respondent also
removed the primary residential exemption on the property. Petitioners have appealed the
Respondent's actions to the Tax Commission, asking that the Commission reinstate the property's
primary residential exemption and further reduce the fair market value of the property.
The Respondent asks the Commission to approve its removal of the primary
residential exemption on the subject and increase the property's fair market value t o ^ ^ ^ H based
on an appraisal prepared by.
APPLICABLE LAW
1.

The first issue in this case is whether the taxpayers are entitled to receive the primary

residential exemption on the subject property. Under Article XIII, Section 2(8) of the Utah
•A,

Constitution, the "Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of not to exceed
45% of the fair market vatue of residential property as defined by law[.]" The Legislature has
exercised this power by enacting Utah Code Ann. §59-2-103(2), which requires that the fair market
value of "residential property" be reduced 45%.
2.
For purposes of the 45% exemption, "residential property" is defined in Utah Code
Ann. §59-2-102(27) as follows:
*.:,

"Residential property," for the pui|)oses of the reductions and adjustments
under this chapter, means any property used for residential purposes as a
primary residence. It does not include property used for transient residential
use or condominiums used in rental pools.

-2-

""^^3.

Utah Administrative Rule 884-24-52 ("Rule 52") was promulgated to provide

guidance in administering the 45% residential exemption on primary residences. Pertinent to
the issue in this case are the following sections of Rule 52:
A. "Household" is as defined in Section 59-2-1202.
B. "Primary residence" means the location where domicile has been
established.
C. Except as provided in D. . . . , the residential exemption . . . is limited to
one primary residence per household.
4.

To determine where "domicile has been established" for purposes of Section B.,

Section E. of Rule 52 provides a nonexclusive list of factors that are determinative of
domicile, which include:

S
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

whether or not the individual voted in the place he claims to be
domiciled;
"
the length of any continuous residency in the location $ajmed as
domicile;
* i'"»
the nature and quality of the living accommodations that an individual
has in the location claimed as domicile as opposed to any other
location;
the presence of family members in a given location;
the place of residency of the individual's spouse or the state of any
divorce of the individual and his spouse;
the physical location of the individual's place of business or sources of
income;
the use of local bank facilities or foreign bank institutions;
the location of registration of vehicles, boats, and RVs;
membership in clubs, churches, and other social organizations;
the addresses used by the individual on such things as: a) telephone
listings; b) mail; c) state and federal tax returns; d) listings in
official government publications or other correspondence; e) driver's
license; f) voter registration; and g) tax rolls;
location of public schools attended by the individual or the individual's
dependents;
the nature and payment of taxes in other states;
-3-

13.

14.
15.
16.
17.
5.

declarations of the individual: a) communicated to third parties; b)
contained in deeds; c) contained in insurance policies; d) contained
in wills; e) contained in letters; f) contained in registers; g)
contained in mortgages; and h) contained in leases.
the exercise of civil or political rights in a given location;
any failure to obtain permits and licenses normally required of a
resident;
the purchase of a burial plot in a particular location;
the acquisition of a new residence in a different location.

Section A. of Rule 52 provides that the definition of "household," as found in

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1202, will also apply to the rule. "Household" is defined in Section
59-2-1202 as "the association of persons who live in the same dwelling, sharing its

^

furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and expenses."
6.

The second issue in this appeal involves the fair market value of the subject property.
i

Pertaining to this issue, all tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and
equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by
law. Utah Code Ann. 59-2-103(1).
7.

I

Petitioner has the burden to establish that the market value of the subject property is

other than that as determined by Respondent. Utah Admin. R. R861-1 A-7(G). To prevail in a real .
property tax dispute, the Petitioner must (1) demonstrate that the County's original assessment
contained error, and (2) provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary basis for reducing the
original valuation to the amount proposed by Petitioner. Nelson V. Bd Of Equalization of Salt Lake
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County, 943 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1997).

«
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DISCUSSION
There are two issues that the Commission will address in this appeal. The first issue
is whether the primary residential exemption should be applied to the subject property. The
second issue concerns the fair market value of the subject property.
Primary Residential Exemption. Although the County originally assessed the subject
property as eligible for the primary residential exemption, Respondent specifically removed
the exemption when the local board of equalization reviewed the property. At issue is
whether the Petitioners were entitled to the primary residential exemption on the lien date,
January 1, 2001. To determine whether the subject property should receive a primary
residential exemption, we must examine where J H H H H H H H H H B B H f t w e r e
domiciled on the lien date and determine if they comprise a "household," as defined in
Section 59-2-1202. If they are both domiciled at the same location and comprise a
"household," then, subject to Section C. of Rule 52, they may only receive one primary
residential exemption. Onthgotbftr1ianriJ f < ^ J | H | ^ ^ B B B B B M f c t o each receive
a primary residentiaLexemption. they would need to show that they are domiciled at different
locations and do not comprise a household,—.
Both parties supplied information concerning the Petitioners' places of domicile as of
the lien date. Petitioners contend that because the subject property was I H f l ^ P ^ r i m a r y
residence during 2001, they are entitled to the primary residential exemption on the property.
The Respondent argues that because the couple has another home in Arizona on which they
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also received a primary residential exemption for 2001, the couple is not entitled to a
"second" such exemption on the subject property.
•own both the subject property and a home inj
Arizona, as well as various rental properties in the Salt Lake area. ftMHHfenoved into the
subject property upon its completion in June 2000. Prior to that, she had lived for a period of
time in a rental property that the couple owned in the Salt Lake area. She has worked for
many years in the Salt Lake area as a nurse and was responsible for administering the
couples' rental units, which consisted of a 7-plex, a 4-plex, two condos, and a single-family
residence in the Salt Lake area. Although she routinely visited the Page area to be with her
husband, she spent approximately 80% of her time in Utah for a period of years prioifo the
lien date.
Information provided at the hearing shows that ^^BHBMhoIds a Utah nursing
license with a 2000 effective date and was registered to vote at a district in the Brighton area
in October 2000. Numerous monthly bills and statements relating to the subject property
were sent to ^ftttt

alone or t o ^ ( B H B ^ n c f l f l | H H B M i together at the address of

the subject property in Brighton on and around the lien date and since on a continuing basis.
There is a telephone at the subject property with I M M I s name listed in the telephone
directory. J M f l H D ^ d o c t o r s have been located in Utah for years and she has worked
continually in Utah, although sometimes on a part-time basis, since the late 1980's.

»6-

Fn once worked in Arizona for two years (from 1994 through 1996), after
which she let her Arizona nursing license expire. During this period, she lived in Arizona
approximately 70% of the time and in Utah the remaining time. For many years, the
Petitioners have filed their income taxes as Arizona residents. They have filed Utah joint
returns as Utah non-residents during this period. Also during this period, the couples'
vehicles were all registered in Arizona. f H I ^ H K

1

explained that this was necessary

because the couple often switched vehicles when his wife visited him or he visited her.
VHBi^QBroYe a vehicle registered in Arizona and filed joint income tax*returns
with her husband as Arizona residents. Nevertheless, when considering the factors or
evidence determinative of domicile in Section E. of Rule 52, the majority of the information
provided at the Initial Hearing indicates that

flflHHfewas

domiciled in Utah prior to

January 1, 2001, the lien date at issue, as well as for the entirety of 2001.
J H H H H H P v a s employed in Page, Arizona from 1994 until Summer 2002, at
which time he accepted employment in the Salt Lake area and moved into the subject
property with his wife. During this period, he lived in the home the couple owned in Page.
He also he voted in Arizona, filed income tax returns as an Arizona resident, and registered
his vehicle in Arizona. He claims that once his wife moved to Salt Lake from Arizona in
1996, he spent 60 to 70% of his time in Arizona, with the other 30 to 40% of his time spent
in Utah visiting his wife. Although he owned property in Utah during this period with his
wife, when considering the factors and evidence determinative of domicile in Section E. of
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Rule 52, there is little question from the information provided at the Initial hearing that
was domiciled in Arizona prior to the lien date, January 1,2001, and was until his
return to Utah in 2002.
Accordingly, as of the lien date at issue, January 1,2001, the Commission considers
to be domiciled in Utah at the subject property

an

^ | j ^ ^ H | H f l j V to be

domiciled in Arizona at the home in Page. Asthe parties were domiciled at two separate
locations on January 1, 200 L the Commission does not consider them to be a "household,"
asjdgfmed in Section A. of Rule 5? and Serrfinn ^9-2-1 ?fl?, n n fhe lien date.. A "household.'^
for purposes of the primary residential exemption, is defined as "the association of persons
who live^jryji£Lsara^

accommodations, and
ere domiciled in different locations on the lien

date. Although thev routinely visited one another, we do not consider persons with separate
domiciles to live in the "same dwelling" and, as a result, they do not constitute a single
"household," This ruling comports with the decision in Tax Commission Appeal No. 020598 (2002), in which the Commission stated that a couple could each receive a primary
residential exemption if they showed that they were domiciled at different locations and did
not comprise a household.
Section C. of Rule 52 provides that the primary residential exemption is limited to
one primary residence per household. Respondent argues that because the Petitioners also
received a 2001 primary residential exemption on their property in Arizona, this limitation
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••• prevents them receiving the exemption on the subject property. * As discussed above, the
J
f
t
t Commission c o n s i d e r ^ m ^ and V H H H H ^ t o be two households as of the lien
date. As such, the limitation of Section C, which applies to a single household, does not
apply to the Petitioners. Accordingly, it is not necessary for us to determine if the Petitioners
P ost ~

received a primary residential exemption on their Arizona property. W/t//K/Kt^

hearing objections to the Arizona primary residential exemption evidence presented by the
Respondent at the Initial Hearing are disregarded, as this evidence had no bearing on the
Commission's decision.
As the subject property was ftp "rip™i p il^lfli^

date at issue, it

qualifies as a "primary residence," as defined in Section B. of Rule 52, and should receive
the 45% primary residential exemption for "residential property," as defined in Utah Code
Ann. §59-2-102(27). The limitation of one primary residential exemption per household is
.

_

•

•'

" "

' • - " "

-

—

••

'

not relevant under the circumstances present in this appeal. Accordingly, the Commission
finds that the primary residential exemption should be reinstated on the subject property for
the 2001 tax year.
As an aside, in the testimony provided by Petitioners, they indicated that at one point
their motor vehicles were registered in Arizona, not Utah. With both Petitioners now
apparently domiciled in Utah, their vehicles should be registered in Utah, in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. §41-1 a-201. Driving without Utah registration after establishing residency
can result in $1000 minimum fine, as provided for in Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1303(2)(a).

-9-

i

Fair Market Value. For the 2001 tax year, the subject property was assessed at
Included in the documents forwarded from the county hearing were two
recommendations fron^appraisers from the County assessor's office. One, dated January 3,
2001 and signed by ( H H B H i l ^ ^

m m e n

^ ^ ^ a t ^ e Respondent (the County BOE)

sustain the J ^ ^ J ^ i s s e s s c d value for the subject. Another, dated April 4,2002 and signed
by 9 | | H H | B
flBHMI

recommen

d s that the Respondent reduce the value of the property to

based on appraisals submitted by the Petitioners and the Petitioners' information

that curing the water problems associated with the subject lot would cost approximately
•

% *

I H B V . The Respondent reduced the fair market value of the subject property t o V H H H i
at the county hearing. At the Initial Hearing before the Commission, the Respondent asks
that the Commission to increase the fair market value of the subj^pt to \
appraisal prepared b ^ B H H B H f

on

November 5, 2002.

| based on an
*

After the hearing, the Petitioners submitted a post-hearing document that included a
request to place minimum weight on the Respondent's appraisal because the Petitioners did
not have adequate time to prepare a response to it and because of the Petitioners' perception
of bias on the part °f

flH|H|HB

Although we make note of Petitioners' concerns, the

Commission does not feel the Petitioners are adequately disadvantaged to warrant our
granting their request.
Petitioners presented three appraisals concerning the subject property. The first one
was dated February 28, 2000 and concluded that the value of the subject property would be
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approximately 0 H H H P upon completion fMMpMP for the "as is" condition prior to
v completion and a statement that approximatelj^JJPBkvould be required to complete the
home) (hereinafter referred to as the ^BBBB^appraisal"). A second appraisal dated
November 19, 2001 concluded th& subject had a value of#BBBBP (the
appraisal")^ while a-third dated June 6,2002 concluded a value ol^HBHHptlie'
appraisal"). Ajs stated above, we also received a fourth appraisal from the Respondent, in
which€IHHHHBHpconcluded the subject had a value o ^ H B P B ^ ( t h e 4 R H H | |
appraisal").
*

*When we review the three appraisals submitted by the Petitioners ancl the one
submitted by the Respondent, it is apparent that the four appraisers have differing opinions
concerning the subject's value. Two of the appraisers valued the subject a t ^ H B ^ a n d

< f l M H H l respectively. However, Hie other two appraisers consider the home worth
considerably more, overUBPBB^Lore.
Neither of the appraisers who estimated the subject's value a t V H R H ^ a n d
(JJBBBBPrespectively, supplied any narrative explaining why they chose the comparable
sales they used. We note that soing of the comparables in these two appraisals were much
smaller and inferior homes than the subject property. Concerning this point, the appraiser
who prepared the^(J(BBfappraisal stated in his narrative that the use of such smaller and
inferior comparables would render the analysis of the subject's value nearly worthless.

• 1 1 -

•:$*&.'.*>••#£

'^$?#*':ji$:*'~

In addition, in t h e ^ H H P appraisal and'the^i^BHI appraisal, the respective
appraisers used a^P^er square foot adjustment to account for differences in the size of the
subject and the comparables. On the other hand, in t h e ^ H M appraisal and the!
appraisal, these appraisers used a ^ p a n d # ( ^ p e r squarefiSotadjustment,' respectively.
There are no remarks in the first two appraisals why a^^^djustment was used, but the
lappraisal included remarks that a higher adjustment per square foot was required in
"canyon" property because of the greater cost to build. We also note that the first two
appraisals incorrectly identified the subject as having a two-car garage, while the last two
appraisals correctly identified it as having a three-car garage.
For these reasons, the Commission believes that the appraisers who prepared the
lappraisal and thefB^H^appraisal had a better knowledge of the subject property
and used more appropriate comparables and adjustments necessary to effectively appraise the
subject. The€HBB(pappraisal and the€BBPBlappraisal appear to be inferior documents
and, accordingly, are regarded little weight in our decision.
When comparing the^((pB^ppraisal and the t H M appraisal, we note that
each appraisal used the same "comparable number 1," namely a property located atf
Khat sold in January, 2000. However, we also note that
m

t h e f J ( B H a P P r a i s a l the appraiser lists the sales price of this comparable as t H H V

and describes the sale as a private sale. On the other hand, in the 4 H H f appraisal, ^fe
lists the sales price as JjjjHlHand provides a Multiple Listing Service reference
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number that apparently relaftes to th#sale,. Multiple Listing Service, however, has no record
of such a reference iiumber. If this comparable is-disregarded because of the sales price
discrepancy, the remaining two comparable that sold and were used in the j p ^ H k p p r a i s a l
show adjusted values o f ^ H H ^ p n d j H N r

^ e a ' s o s e e t ' i a t ^ S H H | 1 S remar ks

m

this appraisal that the comparable that adjusted to 4 H H H § ' i e best indicator of value for
the subject property. However, he does not state why he concluded in his appraisal the
subject to have a fflflflfc >value,
value,which
whichisishigher
higherthan
thanthis
this• H B H K t h e supposed "best
indicator for the value" of the subject property.
For these reasons, we find that the
[appraisal is the best indicator of the
f-'"
subject property's value from the evidence submitted at the Initial Hearing. However, this is
•-•

••

- i *

a value that does not have any adjustment relating to the^ubject property's water problems
f

that were found to exist after the*

X dated
[appraisal was completed. In a letteV

% September 12,2001, to the Respondent,^

| stated the community water system

'Hhat services the subject property is nonfunctional for five months each year between
^

December and May. Accordingly, we believes that the value of the subject property should
be reduced an amount equal to what it would cost to provided year-round water to the
property. In the letter, he explained that an upgrade to the community water system costing
at least flHHM^ould solve the problem. Although this cost would solve the water problem
that exist for all homes in t h e ^ H H H H H B H M l B ' he believes the entire cost to cure
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should be deducted from his property's value because the other residents are not interested in
such a solution.
We are hesitant to deduct the entire cost to cure the water problem fronmhe subject
property's value. First, the water problem is apparently not so severe that the?Petitioners are
unable to live in the subject during the five months each ye&r the system is nonfunctional.
Second, we have received no evidence of what steps the Petitioners must take to rectify this
problem each year so that, they can remain in the property. Third, thete is no evidence that
the fair market value of the home is impacted by the entire cost to cure the subdivision's
water problem. Fourth, there is no certainty ^hat theFPetitioner would have to bear the entire
cost to cure a problem that is borne by an entire subdivision. For these reasons, we reject the
Petitioner's request to subtract H f l H | r o m ^ e

va ue

^

°f the subject property.

The only appraiser who addressed tfife subject's water problem was
hisflHHHM appraisal. It was his opinion that the "sbasonal" water situation reduced the
value of the subject property • • • • [

We consider hisflHHIMestimate the most

convincing evidence submitted at the Initial Hearing concerning the reduction in value
resulting from the water problem.
Having earlier concluded that the value of the subject property would be
before considering the water issue, a reduction offBHfc fr°m this value would result in a
Ifair market value for the subject property. Based on all the evidence submitted, we
find the fair market value of the subject property as of the lien date to be|
-14-
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The Petitioners also contend that the subject property is assessed at a higher value
than similar nearby homes. However, it is obvious that homes in the subject property's
neighborhood vary significantly in size, quality of construction, age, and value. Much more
information would be required to show that other homes assessed at lower values are so
similar to the subject property that assessing the subject property at its fair market value
would be inequitable.
DECISION AND ORDER
The Petitioners have provided evidence to convince the Commission that the
subject property is entitled to the primary residential exemption for the 2001 tax year and orders
the county to reinstate the exemption. In addition, based on the evidence submitted by all parties,
the Commission finds the fair market value of the subject property to be f H H f l f a s Qf the lien
date. It is so ordered.
This decision does not limit a party's right toja Formal Hearing. However, this
Decision and Order will become the Final Decision and Order of the Commission unless any party to
this case files a written request within thirty (30) days of the date of this decision to proceed to a
Formal Hearing. Such a request shall be mailed to the address listed below and rriust include the
Petitioner's name, address, and appeal number:

'*

;

*

Utah State Tax Commission
Appeals Division
210 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
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